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ALLEGRO is an experimental high-temperature gas 
(He)-cooled fast reactor (GFR) under development by the 
European Consortium “V4G4 Centre of Excellence” on 
basis of the concept ALLEGRO presented by CEA in 
2009. Its main purpose is to demonstrate the viability of 
GFR in pilot scale and simultaneously serve as a test bed 
for GFR-related technologies, above all the high-
temperature resistant refractory fuel in the conventional 
oxide fuel driver core. Severe accident studies of the 
concept with the first core (oxide fuel in stainless steel 
claddings) are an important part of safety analyses 
leading to improves in reactor design and safety. This 
paper extends our previous study using the MELCOR 
code. Major difference between the previous and this 
work is decrease of thermal power and power density to 
50 MWth and 66,6 MWth/m
3
 respectively. Analyses are 
focused on protected scenarios based on total station 
blackout individually aggravated by loss of primary 
coolant, water ingress into primary coolant or 
malfunction of check valves in the decay heat removal 
system. The results indicate the timing and extent of core 
degradation and provide valuable data for design of the 
core catcher in ALLEGRO.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since no gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR) has ever been 
built, a small demonstration reactor is necessary on the 
road towards the full-scale GFR. A concept of this 
experimental fast reactor cooled with helium, called 
ALLEGRO, has been developed by an European 
consortium “V4G4 Centre of Excellence” (V4G4) since 
2013. The consortium consists of nuclear research 
organizations of the Czech Republic (ÚJV Řež, a. s.), 
Hungary (MTA-EK Budapest), Poland (NCBJ Swierk) 
and Slovakia (VUJE a.s.) associated with the French 
Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies 
alternatives (CEA). ALLEGRO is an important step on 
the way to the full scale Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (e.g. the 
GFR2400 concept by CEA
1
), one of the six concepts 
selected by the Generation IV International Forum, and 
one of the three fast reactors supported by the European 
Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform 
(SNETP). 
Starting from the reference pre-conceptual design 
studied between 2001-2009 at CEA (ALLEGRO CEA 
2009)
2
, Fig 1, the project by V4G4 is exploring a new, 
lower target volumetric power density, reduced from the 
original 100 MWt/m
3
, to be compatible with the safety 
limits and the design requirements. At the same time, the 
feasibility of a pin type LEU UOX start-up (first) core 
with stainless steel claddings as alternative to MOX fuel 
is being considered. This start-up core, to be used in the 
first period of the reactor operation, will include 
experimental positions dedicated to the refractory fuel 
development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Primary circuit of ALLEGRO enclosed in a 
pressure boundary (guard vessel). Support structures and  
auxiliary systems are not shown. 
 
 
Safety analyses including severe accident studies are 
part of the design process of ALLEGRO with the start-up 
core
3
. The weak point of this concept is the stainless steel 
widely used in the core. Its relatively low melting point 
(between 1300-1400 ºC) makes the concept susceptible to 
overheating and, thus, also to severe fuel damage and to 
core meltdown.  
 The first severe accident study of the ALLEGRO 
CEA 2009 using MELCOR 2.1 has been published 
recently
4
 and was aimed mainly at confirming the 
applicability of MELCOR to ALLEGRO. This study 
discusses the process of core degradation in ALLEGRO 
with the first MOX core and power limited to 50 MWt 
(~66 MWt/m
3
). Computer code MELCOR version 2.1 
was used to analyze protected scenarios characterized by 
total station blackout individually aggravated by loss of 
primary coolant, water ingress into primary coolant or 
malfunction of check valves in the decay heat removal 
system. The obtained experience enables us to start first 
qualitative & quantitative considerations about use of a 
core catcher in ALLEGRO. 
 
II. SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENOLOGY IN 
ALLEGRO WITH THE FIRST CORE 
 
The phenomenology of refractory core degradation is 
discussed in Ref. 5 and Ref. 6. The phenomenology of 
degradation of the first core with oxide fuel in stainless 
steel tubes is different from that of the refractory core. 
Large amount of molten materials can appear at 
temperatures well below 1500 ºC. 
The most pronounced source of molten material 
during a SA in ALLEGRO is melting of the fuel assembly 
austenitic stainless steel claddings & wrapper tubes (15-
15Ti /AIM1 above cca 1320 ºC) and materials of the core 
structural components (AISI-316: 1375-1400 ºC, AISI-
304: 1400-1450 ºC).  
 
II.A. Material Interactions in SA conditions 
 
 Material interactions in SA conditions in ALLEGRO 
are governed either by exposition of materials to gas 
(nitrogen ingress from guard vessel during LOCAs, water 
steam due to water ingress from DHR loops) or by 
formation of eutectics in material couples in contact.  
Water steam can cause high-temperature oxidation of 
the steel core internals such as fuel claddings and support 
plates, leading to degradation of their mechanical 
properties and possibly even to failure of their supporting 
function, as has been shown in Ref. 4. 
Nitridation of steels, such as AISI-304, at high 
temperatures causes degradation of the mechanical 
properties, this process is, however, usually slower than 
the typical times of in-vessel phase of a severe accident
7 
and contact of steel internals with hot nitrogen would not 
probably be the main reason of their mechanical failure. 
Immediate effect of hot nitrogen on AIM1 steel at high 
temperatures is currently unknown and experimental data 
are needed. 
The most important among the chemical interactions 
leading to formation of eutectics is the one between the 
B4C absorber (pellet or powder) and the austenitic control 
rod wrapper tube made of 15-15Ti /AIM1 stainless steel, 
where the eutectics forms at temperatures below 1300 °C 
(1250 ºC in case of AISI-304)8 
 
II.B. Core Degradation Mechanisms 
 
Core degradation in ALLEGRO with the first core is 
driven mostly by the physical phenomena, due to very 
limited chemical interaction between the fuel pellets, 
cladding and, above all, coolant, which is an inert gas. It 
is characteristic with rapid propagation in the first (tens 
of) minutes after the disbalance in heat production and 
removal in the core occurs. It is followed by a slower 
evolution into the next phases of the severe accident. The 
slower onset of the later in-vessel phases is caused by 
relatively low total decay power produced in the degraded 
fuel, dropping to cca 700 kW after one hour from the 
reactor shutdown.   
Melting and failure of the cladding can occur before 
the fuel reaches the melting temperature, due to very 
limited chemical interactions combined with very 
significant difference in melting temperatures of the 
cladding (cca 1600 K) and fuel (cca 3000 K). It could lead 
to compaction of the fuel pellets and other debris, causing 
its recriticality. In some extreme cases, this mechanism 
can lead even to prompt critical configurations.
9
 
Fast excursions to temperatures over 1100 °C also 
causes the top of the two core support plates in 
ALLGERO, made of steel, to fail quite early, before 
significant amount of other core internals, such as the 
reflector sub assemblies, is melted. A scheme of the 
process of degradation with an estimation of the  amount 
of melted materials relocating into the lower head is in 
Fig. 2. The estimations mentioned in the previous text are 
based on early explorative analyses of ALLEGRO core 
degradation carried out in MELCOR 1.8.6. 
 Several observations can be made, based on the 
information in the scheme. First, amount of oxides in the 
molten corium is relatively low, because the only oxide 
material present in the core is the MOX fuel. No 
additional oxidation should occur, except for the water 
ingress scenarios (atmosphere inside the GV is pure 
nitrogen). 
  
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of ALLEGRO core degradation. 
 
Corium coming from molten ALLEGRO first core 
will contain a large amount of metallic phase, mainly steel 
from molten reactor internals,. This composition should 
suppress the focusing effect, and the most probable points 
of lower head failure are, therefore, located in the bottom 
penetrations used  for the control rod driving mechanism 
(CRDM). 
The lack of other oxide materials in the oxide phase 
contained in the lower head before its failure is yet 
another issue potentially leading to recriticality of the 
degraded core. 
 
III. MELCOR MODEL 
 
A model of 75 MWth ALLEGRO based on CEA 
2009 design was developed in UJV
4
. For the studies 
presented in this paper, the model has been adapted to 
include new changes in design. It means mainly reducing 
the nominal power to 50 MWth. while keeping the same 
inlet and outlet temperatures. It has been achieved by 
reducing the nominal coolant flow  rate to 2/3 of the 
 
TABLE 1. Nominal operation simulation 
Property Target Value 
(75 MW) 
Target Value 
(50 MW) 
Calculated 
value 
Nominal 
Power 
(MWth) 
75.0 50.0 50.0 
Core mass 
flow (kg/s) 
53.6 35.5 35.2 
Core inlet T 
(°C) 
260.0 260.0 258.5 
Core outlet T 
(°C) 
530.0 530.0 533.0 
Maximum 
cladding T 
(°C) 
610.0 610.0 602.6 
 
 
Fig. 3. Model of DHR system water circuits 
 
nominal value for the 75 MW reactor. Comparison of 
selected nominal values to those calculated in MELCOR 
is shown in TABLE 1. 
Another significant modification of the MELCOR 
model is rearrangement of the secondary (water) circuit of 
the DHR system. In the original model it was assumed 
that the main part of the circuit is common for all the 
three loops and it splits just above the He/water heat 
exchangers to three separate loops. In the new model, 
there are three separated water circuits, interconnected by 
a duct on top of the final pools. A 3D CAD model of the 
circuits is shown in Fig. 3. 
Overall core geometry model remains the same as for 
the 75 MWth version - BWR, which represents the actual 
core of ALLEGRO the best. The only problem with using 
this global core model is that it automatically puts non-
supporting structures such as reflector SAs and control 
rods  in the bypass control volumes, which is not the case 
in real ALLEGRO. It has been solved for the steel non-
supporting structures, which are modeled internally as 
cladding, but it cannot be solved for the control rods, 
which had to be put in the bypass. For this reason, when 
evaluating the amounts of relocated materials in the core 
catcher design assumptions, it is always assumed that all 
the B4C from the control SAs relocated, even if it is not 
predicted in MELCOR. 
MELCOR offers several possibilities of triggering 
the failure of the vessel lower head. Model used in this 
paper  is triggering the failure when temperature inside of 
the lower head (mesh 3 of 8) reaches melting temperature 
of the RPV steel. 
Because MELCOR does not allow other fissile 
material than UO2 in the COR fuel components, physical 
properties of internal material UO2 were changed to 
 correspond with those valid for MOX with 25 % Pu 
content. More information on this particular issue can be 
found in Ref. 4. 
Another important issue is connected to the 
recriticality of degraded core after the cladding of the fuel 
pins fails. The MELCOR model was set up with the total 
power in the core after reactor shutdown always equal to 
decay power only, recriticality issues are not solved 
within the scope of this study.  
 
IV. TRANSIENTS 
 
In total, 4 cases of 3 types of transients were studied. 
They were expected to be the most penalizing transients 
in ALLEGRO, leading to severe core damage and RPV 
failure. They were selected without any attention paid to 
probability of  such combinations of initiating and 
aggravating events. It is needed to emphasize here, that all 
the studied transients are far beyond the design basis of 
the reactor and some of them should even be excluded by 
design. They serve solely to study the ways and speed of 
propagation of the core degradation and to sett of proper 
conservative boundary conditions for the development of 
the core catcher. 
 The transients studied in this paper are: 
a) LB-LOCA aggravated by SBO and failure of N2 
injection system 
b) Water ingress (1 DHR loop) aggravated by SBO 
c) Water ingress (2 DHR loops) aggravated by SBO 
d) Failure of DHR check-valves opening aggravated 
by SBO 
 
In case a), breach in one of the main cold legs is 
followed by SBO, i.e. unavailability of all active safety 
systems. Rundown of the main blowers keeps the main 
check-valves open for 45 seconds after reactor shutdown. 
then, cooling of the reactor is transferred from the main 
primary loops to the DHR loops in natural convection 
mode.  
Cases b) and c) simulate loss of tightness in 1 or 2 
He/water heat exchangers in the DHR system loops. 10 
U-tubes in each exchanger is assumed to be damaged 
(resulting in 0,015 m2 of breach flow area). With no 
active systems available due to SBO and 1 or 2 DHR 
loops ineffective because of leaking water and isolation of 
the respective DHR secondary (water) circuits by check-
valves, the reactor core is cooled by the remaining DHR 
loop(s) in natural convection mode after the main blowers 
rundown. 
Case d) represents the boundary scenario with the 
fastest core degradation. Due to failure of opening of all 
the check-valves in the DHR loops, combined with SBO, 
the core is effectively isolated from any possible cooling 
loops - the main check-valves close automatically after 
the main blowers rundown (mass flow rate less than 3% 
of the nominal). 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
Presented results are focused mainly on the timing and 
extent of core degradation. Results of analyses of  cases    
a) - d) are described individually.  The last subchapter 
summarizes amounts of materials relocated into the lower 
head of RPV after the support plate failure, which are 
used as an input for the analysis of core catcher options. 
 
V.A. LB-LOCA aggravated by SBO and N2 injection 
failure  
 
Depressurization of the reactor through the breach is very 
fast, pressures inside and outside the primary circuit are 
within 0,1 MPa after 13 seconds.  
First melting of the cladding occurs 25 minutes after the 
reactor shutdown. The total extent of core degradation is 
shown in Fig. 4. The figure shows the nodes of COR 
package (core itself + the lower head of RPV), purple, 
yellow and orange color represents degraded material. It 
can be seen that the upper support plate does not fail 
despite degradation of the most of the core. The 
temperature of the supporting plate is decreasing from      
t = 15 h, reaching peak temperature 659 °C. The 
mechanical load is constant from t = 3,5 h. Temperatures 
of debris and melt in the degraded region reach maximum 
at t = 4,8 h. 
From the above presented data, it can be reasonably 
expected that the degraded configuration shown in Fig. 4 
(situation at  t = 28 h) is the final one. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Extent of the core degradation after 28h 
 (LB-LOCA + SBO) 
  
V.B.  Water ingress (1 DHR loop) aggravated by SBO 
 
This particular scenario has been already analyzed for 
the 75 MWth ALLEGRO
4
. The only change in the input, 
apart from the reduction of the reactor power, is different 
volume of water which cannot be isolated from the 
primary circuit. The new value is higher - 2,6 m3. It is 
due to an update in the design of the DHR water circuit. 
Now it is clear where the isolation valves in the circuit are 
located and the respective amount of water in the duct 
outside of the He/water HX has been added to the 
previously used value. 
The progress of the accident is very similar to the 
calculations concerning the 75 MWth reactor. After the 
main blower rundown period, the core is cooled by 2 
DHR loops in natural convection. The cooling capacity of 
the third loop is very limited because the respective water 
circuit is isolated 5 seconds after the break. 
If the primary circuit is not depressurized, water, 
initially entering in the form of steam, starts to condensate 
in the cooler parts of the circuit and is being collected in 
the lowest part of the circuit, which is the lower head of 
the RPV. Large amounts of steam are then entering the 
core region and, as a consequence, steel cladding of the 
fuel starts to oxidize. This process causes gradual 
mechanical failure of the oxidized cladding, first 
occurring at t = 1,5 h. Progression of the scenario is quite 
slow, the upper support plate fails after 6 days. There was 
no failure of the bottom support plate in 7 days of the 
problem time calculated, but it can be reasonably 
expected, that the final state would be the same as in 
scenario c). 
Depressurization of the primary circuit does not help 
the situation in any way, the final result and timing is 
approximately the same. On one hand, it prevents 
formation of the liquid water pool in the lower head and 
significantly reduces oxidation of the cladding and steel 
reactor internals, on the other hand, the overall cooling 
capacity of the DHR system in natural circulation 
dramatically decreases due to low helium density at lower 
pressure.  
 
          a) t = 9 h          b) t = 14,5 h 
Fig. 6 a) to d) - Progression of the severe accident 
during scenario SBO + WI from 2 DHR loops 
 
Fig. 5. Extent of the core degradation after  6 days 
 (SBO + WI from 1 DHR loop) 
 
V.C.  Water ingress (2 DHR loops) aggravated by SBO 
 
The scenario is very similar to the previous one, as 
well as the progression. The main qualitative difference is 
rather early failure of the supporting plates due to 
overtemperature. It happens mainly due to large amount 
of water in the lower head, surface of which is reaching 
the lower supporting plate and effectively blocking the 
flow of helium through the core. The only coolant flowing 
through the core from t = 1900 s is steam evaporated  
from the pool in the lower head. 
The upper support plate fails at t = 9 h due to 
overtemperature, the lower one at t = 14,5 h due to 
mechanical overload. Debris and melt relocating into the 
lower head are quenched in the water pool, causing 
massive evaporation and further oxidation. The total 
decay heat is quite low after the pool is dried out               
(t = 27 h), namely 325 kW,  so the lower head does not 
fail. The progress of core degradation is showed in Fig. 6, 
state showed in Fig. 6 d) can be considered as the final 
state. 
                 c) t = 16 h                d) t = 27 h 
  
Fig. 7. Relocated core debris just before failure of the 
lower head (scenario failure of check-valves opening) 
 
V.D. Failure of DHR check-valves opening aggravated 
by SBO 
 
In this scenario, there are no means of reactor 
cooling after the first 45 s from SCRAM, apart from 
radiation from the primary circuit surface. Therefore, it 
should be the envelope scenario for the core catcher with 
the highest residual heat after the melt ejection, and 
highest demands on amount of the sacrificial material in 
the core catcher to prevent recriticality and to achieve a 
coolable composition of corium. 
The propagation of the accident is very fast. Firt 
melting of the cladding occurs at t = 16,5 min., the upper 
support plate fails at t = 2,4 h due to overtemperature and 
the lower one at t = 8,5 h due to mechanical failure. The 
lower head fails at t = 18 h. 
The effect of nitrogen injection is neglectable, its 
introduction results in postponing of lower head failure by 
approximately one hour. Fig. 7 shows the lower head after 
corium relocation, before the lower head failure. 
 
V.E.Materials relocated to the lower head 
 
TABLE 2 summarizes masses of materials (both 
melted and in form of debris) relocated to the lower head, 
either at the end of the calculation or at the time of 
ejection trough the vessel breach.  
It can be seen that the total mass of the molten 
materials are very similar in both cases which lead to the 
failure of the support plates. It can be safely assumed 
from the data available for the other two cases, that the 
masses would be very similar if the two cases reached the 
relocation phase. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Masses of materials relocated to the lower 
head. 
 case 
Material (kg) a b c d 
Fuel - solid - - 3137 3075 
Fuel - melted - - 90 152 
Steel - debris - - 12874 13222 
Steel - melted - - 183 381 
Steel oxide -solid - - 574 0 
Steel oxide - melted - - 28 0 
B4C - - 148 148 
Total - - 17034 16830 
 
 
VI. CORE CATCHER PRE-DESIGN 
 
This chapter brings some considerations about the 
core catcher  in ALLEGRO, supported by the results of 
analyses presented in chapter V.  As an outcome, first 
draft of the possible core catcher design is presented. 
 
VI.A.  Core catcher design basis 
 
A (definitely not complete) list of design basis 
criteria for the core catcher has been prepared and is 
available in TABLE 3. 
Maximum CC dimensions are limited by both the 
dimensions of the GV and the  position of the RPV inside 
the GV. A free space of 90 cm between the edge of the 
CC and the GV wall has been chosen as a safety margin. 
Vertical dimension of the CC is limited by the vertical 
position of the RPV and the CRDM located under it. 
TABLE 3. Design basis criteria of the core catcher in 
ALLEGRO 
Criterion Value 
CC position Inside GV, under RPV 
Max. dimensions (height x 
radius) 
2 000 mm x 3 900 mm 
Min. free volume 3 m
3
 
Heat removal capacity (at 
least) 
500 kW 
Cooling system Passive + indirect 
 
 
All the analyses done so far indicate, that the 
dependency of the amount of melted material reaching the 
lower head on the accident scenario is rather weak, and 
 the total mass and volume of the material is around        
17 000 kg and 2,5 m3 respectively. This value should be 
taken as the design basis, until a substantial change in the 
core design is made. 
Case d) can be used to obtain the maximum decay 
power at the time of melt ejection to the CC. It is, 
conservatively, taken at the time of the lower support 
plate failure, assuming immediate lower head breach, and 
is equal to 420 kW. 
As the free volume inside the GV is quite small, the 
indirect cooling of the corium in CC is preferable to avoid 
GV overpressurization by gasses released during direct 
corium cooling. The whole system should be fully passive 
to meet one of the GEN IV criteria: To achieve at least the 
safety level of the generation III reactors (which use 
passive core catcher cooling systems). 
 
VI.B.  Core catcher pre-design assumptions 
 
Evaluating the design basis criteria, the design of the 
core catcher wall cooling system similar to EPR seems to 
be an ideal option for the use in the ALLEGRO 
demonstrator. However, the integral concept of the EPR 
core catcher cannot be adopted here, because it requires a 
lot of free space under the RPV inside the GV. 
Experiments described in Ref. 10 show that the 
passive part of the cooling system used in the EPR CC 
(channels inside the CC walls) is able to dissipate up to 80 
kW/m
2
 through the CC wall area. Presuming the maximal 
heat dissipation of 80 kW/m
2
, the cooling area needed for 
a successful corium cooling during the minimal melting 
scenario is 6,25 m
2
. 
Based on the above-mentioned considerations, a pre-
conceptual draft of the CC was proposed by UJV. The 
chosen shape is octangular. The sacrificial material forms 
a centered cone for better corium spreading across the CC 
surface. The sacrificial material has not been set so far. It 
is sure that it will have to dilute the oxidic part of the 
corium, which will compose mostly of the fuel 
debris/melt. Due to high risk of recriticality, it is also 
desirable to include neutron poison into the sacrificial 
material. One potential solution can be to use traditional 
combination of Fe2O3 and Al2O3, with addition of B2O3 as 
the neutron poison. Geometrical parameters can be found 
in TABLE 4, sketch of the CC in Fig. 8. 
As can be seen from TABLE 4, the proposed CC 
meets the design basis criteria well. Area of the bottom of 
the CC is sufficient not only to dissipate the decay heat, 
but also to prevent a thick layer of corium. Typical 
corium composition coming from the scenarios analyzed 
in this paper will make 7 cm thick layer, allowing quite a 
lot of space for the sacrificial material. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.  ALLEGRO core catcher draft dimensions 
Outer side lenght [m] 2,8 
Total height [m] 1,8 
Walls thickness [m] 0,4 
Free volume (available for 
corium) [m
3
] 
up to 36,5*  
Cooling area at the bottom of 
the CC [m
2
] 
37,9 
* (depends on the amount of sacrificial mat.) 
 
Fig. 8. Core catcher draft 
 
 
VII. DISSCUSION OF RESULTS 
 
      It can be seen from the results of same/similar 
transients, that the reduction of the thermal power (and 
power density) has certain positive effects, mainly in the 
depressurized transients, where the extent of the core 
degradation is significantly lower than in the 75 MWth 
version
4
. However, it has no practical impact on the 
results of the water ingress scenario. On the other hand, it 
has to be noted, that the water ingress with the DHR 
system in natural convection is, from the thermal-
hydraulics point of view, very complicated one and the 
results of the presented analyses should be checked by 
other codes, preferably coupled with CFD, to simulate the 
system in more detail. 
Another notable result is that most of the fuel remains 
solid throughout the accidents. It is due to quite a low 
thermal power of the reactor, resulting in small radial 
temperature gradient in the fuel pin after the reactor 
shutdown, and big difference between melting 
temperature of the cladding (1600 K) and the fuel (3000 
K), with very limited chemical interactions. 
 It is very positive, that the only scenario leading to 
breach of the lower head and melt ejection, was the 
boundary “isolation” one - d)., which should be excluded 
by design. On the other hand, all the calculations proved 
the initial assumption, that the general way of degradation 
progress is downwards, with very little material melted in 
the radial direction, which is not preferable. It would be 
better to slow down the failure of the upper supporting 
plate to allow more time for melting of radial core 
internals such as the reflector subassemblies.  
General mechanisms of RPV failure implemented in 
MELCOR are adapted to LWRs and are proven by vast 
amount of experiments. However, there are very little 
practical experience with severe accidents in reactors such 
as ALLEGRO. This issue will have to be addressed in  the 
future. 
Results of the accident calculations were used to 
define a set of design basis criteria of the core catcher. 
Previous conservative approach, dealing with two 
theoretical boundary melting scenarios, was replaced with 
best estimate approach building on the MELCOR 
calculations.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Analysis of 4 cases of severe accidents in ALLEGRO 
with reduced power to 50 MWth using MELCOR 2.1 was 
presented. It focused on phenomenology of a severe 
accident in ALLEGRO with oxide core and stainless steel 
cladding, the computational part was focused on the  
timing and extent of the core degradation. It showed that 
the water ingress scenario is still a major problem even 
with the reduced power density. Results of  LOCA 
scenarios are much more optimistic. Effects of elevated 
back-pressure in the guard vessel should be explored to 
further reduce the extent of core degradation during this 
type of accidents. 
 Results of the analysis were used as an input for 
considerations on core catcher in ALLEGRO. First draft 
of a possible solution of the core catcher was presented. 
Presented work concerning the core catcher should be 
taken as the first step, more analyses of neutronic 
behavior, chemistry of the corium - sacrificial material 
interaction and detailed thermal-hydraulics will have to be 
done before the start of the experimental phase. 
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